Preventing Civil War in Iraq: A News Hour with Jim Lehrer Transcript with Jim Lehrer, Vali Nasr, and Thabit Abdullah; Strategic Insights, v. 5, issue 3 (March 2006) by Lehrer, Jim et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2006-03-01
Preventing Civil War in Iraq: A News
Hour with Jim Lehrer Transcript with Jim
Lehrer, Vali Nasr, and Thabit Abdullah;
Strategic Insights, v. 5, issue 3 (March 2006)
Lehrer, Jim
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Strategic Insights, V. 5, issue 3 (March 2006)
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11337
 Preventing Civil War in Iraq: A News Hour with Jim Lehrer 
Transcript  
Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 3 (March 2006) 
with Jim Lehrer, Vali Nasr, and Thabit Abdullah 
Strategic Insights is a monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
For a PDF version of this article, click here. 
Introduction 
On February 23, 2006, Vali Nasr and Thabit Abdullah were featured as guest experts on News 
Hour with Jim Lehrer. The transcript of the interview below is from Online New Hour. 
 
Two experts discuss the prospects for peace in Iraq, after a wave of revenge killings and attacks 
swept across the country in the wake of Wednesday's bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra. 
JIM LEHRER: For more on this, we're joined by: Thabit Abdullah, a Baghdad native who's an 
associate professor of history at York University in Toronto; and Vali Nasr, professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School and an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on 
Foreign Relations.  
Professor Nasr, what's it going to take to stop this, to calm the storm before all-out civil war is 
triggered?  
VALI NASR: Well that is not going to be easy because of the magnitude of what happened 
yesterday presents a psychological shock for the Shia, a major turning point, as it were. 
It's important that the Shiites realize that the national unity government would actually present 
security to them, it actually will safeguard their future and the task right now is to be able to bring 
security to Iraq very quickly and make sure that the politicians at the center are able to cobble 
together a united front.  
JIM LEHRER: That's a heavy menu you just outlined. Is it possible to happen? Is it possible that it 
will happen?  
VALI NASR: Well, it's not likely that it will happen. It will not happen very easily. I think yesterday 
what happened in Samarra has been a major turning point for the wars in Iraq and now going 
back to the situation even before yesterday is a very tall order for Iraqi politicians as well as for 
the United States.  
JIM LEHRER: Professor Abdullah, do you agree first of all that this is a turning point and, well, do 
you agree it's a turning point?  
THABIT ABDULLAH: Yes, I do actually. Generally speaking, I agree with what Professor Nasr 
said though there are some hopeful signs. One, as an historian, I'm always encouraged by the 
fact that there's never been a sectarian war in Iraq, but there have continuously been tensions.  
Secondly, just a couple of weeks ago there was some very positive signs toward reconciliation 
between the different groups and thirdly, there is now greater weight being played by the secular 
group that is headed by Ayad Allawi. 
Who Benefits from a Civil War?  
JIM LEHRER: Help us understand—is it in anybody's interest, in terms of the major groups, the 
Sunnis and the Shias, for there to be a civil war? Do they have any interest in this violence going 
on, Professor Abdullah? 
THABIT ABDULLAH: Of course, absolutely not. And I believe that the far majority of Iraqis 
understand this very well.  
I was in Iraq about a year after the American invasion and this was what was on everybody's lips, 
that a civil war would be disastrous for everybody; it would be a fire that would consume all.  
But, you know, these things can spin out of control. There are various groups both domestic and 
regional, and I would point the finger directly at Iran here and other groups also that find in its 
interest to whip up this kind hysteria to put pressure on the United States. 
JIM LEHRER: Well Professor Nasr, how do you analyze who is pushing this and who has 
something to gain by there being a civil war?  
VALI NASR: Well, a marginal element on both sides, the extremist elements on both sides have 
something to gain from the violence. And it does not require the majority of Iraqis to want peace 
and harmony for this to happen.  
In other words, as we've seen in Yugoslavia, we've seen in Rwanda, in all of these cases it is not 
those who have common relations with the other side that would define the violence. It's marginal 
groups that define the violence.  
I do not believe Iran is alone involved in Iraq. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, they're also involved 
on the Sunni side of this and it's actually not to Iran's interest at this point in time for Iraq to 
descend into sectarian violence because Iran's game plans for the past months in confronting the 
United States has been to present itself as a Muslim force, to rally Muslims behind Iran around 
issues such as the Danish cartoons or by its attacks on Israel.  
Iran at this point in time does not want to be defined as a Shia power but a Muslim power. And, in 
fact, what happened in Iraq is very damaging to Iran's overall chance vis-à-vis the United States.  
JIM LEHRER: But you see it differently, Professor Abdullah? You think Iran does have an interest 
in making this thing blow up?  
THABIT ABDULLAH: My reading of this is that there are various interest groups among the elite 
of the Iranian state and that there are some within that elite who have been pushing for greater 
involvement in Iraq and taking sides in the sectarian divide actually. This is most noticeable in 
Basra where the Iranian influence is greatest, where when I was there, people were saying that 
Basra is now transforming to an Iranian province actually and there we see the greatest pressure 
being put on Sunnis, on Christians, on others, and it's hard for me to believe that the Shia militias 
that receive enormous amount of aid from Iran are not affected by Iranian designs. 
Negotiations Set Back  
JIM LEHRER: Professor Abdullah, how do you read the decision by this large group of Sunnis 
today to not participate in the summit discussions about forming a new government? Is that a 
major setback?  
THABIT ABDULLAH: It's definitely a setback, though it could actually be a form of pressure on 
some of the Shiite leaders to take a more active role in trying to calm the mob. I wish they hadn't 
backed out but they did need to make some strong statements because a lot of the top Shiite 
leaders, I was rather surprised because Sistani and Hakim and Jaafari and other important Shiite 
leaders have in the past taken an extremely responsible role in trying to calm the sectarian 
tensions.  
But after the bombing—and to a certain extent this is understandable—this is one of the most 
sacred sites that one can imagine for Shias - it houses two imams - and these are sacred figures 
for the Shias - the immediate response of the Shia leaders was not to tell people to stay off the 
streets, to calm down, rather, it is to play into the violence.  
Now nobody actually said, go out and attack Sunnis, and they did condemn some of the attacks 
against the mosques but; nevertheless, they have not specifically come out very strongly in trying 
to calm the mob down.  
JIM LEHRER: Professor Nasr, how do you assess the leadership on both sides in trying to calm 
this thing down, first of all, what they've done and what they could do to make it better? 
VALI NASR: Well, I think the Shia leadership did not have any choice. One cannot 
overemphasize the blow to Shiaism of the destruction of the shrine. The relationship of Shiites, 
particularly average Shiites to their faith are through these same shrines. This was on the attack 
on the very existence, on the very meaning of Shiaism.  
No Shia leader one would be worth his weight his salt if he did not flex his muscle somehow. And 
one could have expected that they could have called for far more than they actually did. 
Secondly, there is a perception among many Shia that the United States and the Sunnis and 
particularly the United States takes Shia calm or the peace in the South, the fact that the Shias 
have not joined the insurgency for granted and periodically we've seen that Ayatollah Sistani did 
this also previously when Paul Bremer wanted to push for a caucus system in Iraq - that he brings 
the mobs into the streets in peaceful demonstrations in order to show the United States that the 
Sunnis, that the other players should not take the Shia's position and the Shia force in general for 
granted that, they have—that it's not only important to placate the Sunni; it's not only important to 
make sure that the Sunnis are pleased with the political process but that also the Shias have 
interests, they have fears, they need security.  
They have a vision of the future and that has to be safeguarded as well if Iraq is to work. It's not 
enough just to see what it takes to bring the Sunnis in. It is important to look at what it takes to 
keep the Shias in the process as well. And that's a signal that Sistani is sending by calling the 
mob into the streets.  
However, what is very worrisome about what happened today is that there is an indication that 
Sistani may no longer be able to control the mob that, that the forces now within the Shia 
community, the anger and the fear are such that his call for restraint may not be holding much 
longer. 
What the United States Can Do  
JIM LEHRER: And Professor Abdullah, that brings to us the United States' role in this now. Is 
there anything at all the United States could do to help calm this thing and keep this thing from 
blowing out of control?  
THABIT ABDULLAH: I was hoping you wouldn't ask me that question actually. But the United 
States has not been very helpful. I must tell you that I was one of those who rejoiced at the 
overthrow of the dictatorship, though I was like the majority of Iraqis, extremely suspicious of U.S. 
intentions.  
I believe that the United States has missed one opportunity after another to play a positive role. 
From the beginning, they started to play the sectarian game in a country that has a very long 
history of secular politics as you noted—the lack of effective security, the Abu Ghraib scandals, 
the joke that is the reconstruction—one disaster after another.  
I believe the United States does not have much credibility in Iraq anymore, especially after the 
Abu Ghraib scandal. If I'm really pushed to answer this question, I would say the only thing that 
the U.S. ambassador can do is try to provide good offices for mediation right now, try to provide 
back-up for Iraqi security if the situation spills over into violence.  
JIM LEHRER: Professor Nasr, what would you add or subtract from that about the U.S. role?  
VALI NASR: Well, I would say in the realm of security, the military, I feel a great deal of danger 
facing the U.S. position, namely we're overstretching Iraq just dealing with the Sunni insurgency. 
If we have to deal with trouble among the Shia—demonstrations, agitation, attacks, even anti-
American demonstrations—we simply won't be able to cope with both a Sunni insurgency and 
Shia anger at the same time.  
Politically I agree with my colleague that the U.S.'s role right now is to help to bring mediation and 
at least help the government in Iraq form sooner rather than later. But unfortunately, given how 
quickly the sectarian tensions are spiraling out of control, I see very little that the U.S. can do at 
this moment to veer Iraq in a new direction.  
JIM LEHRER: Gentlemen, on that down note, I'm sorry, we'll leave it, thank you both very much. 
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